In a departure from genealogy, I have just published a second book about the forward air control (FAC) detachment I served with in Vietnam. RED MARKERS: THE REST OF THE STORY is a sequel to Red Markers, Close Air Support for the Vietnamese Airborne, 1962-1975. The new book picks up a condensed history from the earlier work and expands on stories about the people who served. A lot of new material came to me from Red Hats John Duffy, Dave Fletcher, John Howard, Bob Losik, Barry McCaffrey, and Jesse Myers — members of MACV Advisory Team 162 that fought alongside the Vietnamese Airborne for more than a decade. My thanks to all.
The first chapter about a FAC mission in the Cambodian Fishhook describes in some detail the roles of crew chiefs, radio operators, and FACs to get the job done. This chapter will also appear in the Fall 2022 edition of Air & Space Power History magazine. Another chapter describes the heroic rescue of wounded Airborne troopers and the crew of a downed Medevac helicopter from “Medevac Meadow.” That chapter is included in Phil Marshall’s latest book Helicopter Rescues Vietnam: Volume XVII published in August. Other chapters titled “Living off the Grid” and “Dumb Things in the War Zone” tell a lighter side of the Red Markers’ war.
The Red Marker direct combat role ended in January 1971. This book describes the support received by the Airborne from other FAC detachments during Lam Son 719 in early 1971 and the Easter Offensive in 1972. A separate chapter covers the battles of Kontum, An Loc, and Quang Tri – – battles told in the order the Airborne deployed to each. The supporting FAC units included those with call signs Covey, Nail, Trail, Rustic, Rash, Sundog, and others. The war stories end during the fall of Saigon with escapees being led to safety by a Catholic seminary student, a man now known to some of us as Chaplain Joseph Vu.
RED MARKERS: THE REST OF THE STORY incorporates updated rosters of Red Marker personnel and an extensive index. I hope you find it a worthwhile read as well as a valuable resource.
It is available now at Lulu Publishing and soon at Amazon and Barnes and Noble.
I adore Barry McCaffrey, will get it and read it.
Looking forward to getting my copy, signed of course!
Kudos to my big brother!!
Comment/Message:
Dear Mr. Willis,
I am writing to share a significant historical timeline discrepancy regarding the pre-planning phases of the cross-border excursions into Cambodia and Laos, which directly builds upon the history documented in your book Red Markers.
In standard historical accounts, the planning for the 1970 Cambodian Incursion is typically framed as a rapid, reactionary decision, with unit histories indicating that field planners were called into headquarters roughly three months prior to execution. However, firsthand family records from my family reveal that deep tactical integration for these joint air-ground cross-border operations was being intensely planned in secret a full year earlier.
My uncle was Lt. Col. Robert “Doc” Daugherty Jr. (USAF), who served as a Forward Air Controller (FAC) flying with the 19th Tactical Air Support Squadron (19th TASS) out of Bien Hoa under the tactical call sign “Rash 1.” He was heavily embedded in the clandestine out-of-country aerial interdiction networks of Operation Tiger Hound.
In 1969—a full year before the formal border excursions took place—my uncle was stationed in England commanding the London Flight Service Center. During this exact window, the U.S. government quietly brought my father, Sergeant Willis B. Daugherty (USMC), out to London for a three-week period. My father was a highly experienced U.S. Marine Corps forward artillery observer with specialized combat expertise from the Korean War.
The explicit purpose of this three-week joint cell in London was for my father to train my uncle on specialized ground-to-air tactical coordination—specifically bridging the communication gap (“ground talk”) to ensure low-flying Air Force FAC pilots could seamlessly and safely hand off targets with heavy ground artillery networks operating along the borders.
This 1969 London training cell challenges the accepted history in two major ways:
1. Advanced Strategic Intent: Staging a Marine artillery observer to train an active out-of-country FAC commander in a secure location like London in 1969 proves that a massive, combined air-ground cross-border invasion was being structured at a high intelligence level far in advance.
2. The Operational Disconnect: It suggests that the “three-month notice” given to regular military units in 1970 was merely the final field-execution order, hiding a much deeper, unvouchered pre-planning apparatus that had already built the tactical playbook a year prior.
Given your extensive research into the 19th TASS, the “Rash” net, and the Forward Air Controllers who mapped the Trail, I wanted to bring this 1969 timeline anomaly to your attention. I would be incredibly interested to know if your research files or any declassified operational memos from late 1968/1969 hint at this early interservice pre-planning for the border sectors.
Thank you for your dedicated work in preserving the legacy of the Red Markers.
Warm regards,
Thomas Daugherty
Relative of Lt. Col. Robert “Doc” Daugherty Jr. (Rash 1, 19th TASS) & Sgt. Willis B. Daugherty (USMC)
Thomas,
Thank you for the comment. In answer to your question, no I did not find any memos related to early planning for the Cambodian Incursion. The military, however, regularly engages in contingency planning. I would not surprise me at all that extensive thought had been given to an operation to invade the known base camps sitting right across the border, to be triggered if the timing were ever right.
A couple other facts might be useful. First, the training we each received before going to SEA as Forward Air Controllers included controlling artillery. We learned how to call in a fire mission and to adjust the rounds. Just like we learned how to control air strikes from fighter bombers. Likewise, the Army’s artillery controllers learned how to direct airstrikes, so we were all cross trained.
Second, you must not be aware that Doc Daugherty was not just the leader of the Rash FAC detachment. Before the Cambodian operation ended, he moved from being the Rash Air Liaison Officer, to lead the Red Markers! He was my boss for about a month before I returned stateside. I talked to him extensively about Cambodia when I visited him in Fort Worth while writing the first Red Marker book. He reviewed the draft.
Cheers,
Gary